

SOCIALISTS AND THE COMMONWEALTH

# Venture

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## Comment

### SOUTH AFRICA - 'AU REVOIR'

SOUTH AFRICA'S withdrawal from the Commonwealth marked the climax of an unprecedented drama at the Prime Ministers' Conference. As a matter of deliberate policy the British Government had played down the whole issue of South Africa's membership, by suggesting that other 'larger' issues would concern the Conference. With the same object in view the first three days were taken up with discussion of world affairs—disarmament, East-West relations, the Congo—to give Dr. Verwoerd the opportunity to make himself at home with his critics. Having taken soundings by correspondence before the Conference began, the U.K. Government was apparently confident that South Africa's application would be granted, without enthusiasm but without open dissent.

Instead the application was withdrawn. The plan's reversal owes itself largely to the focusing of public opinion here and in other Commonwealth countries on race relations and the South African issue. The dignified vigil outside Lancaster House helped to make *apartheid* the major issue for the Conference. The angry dispute between Lord Salisbury and Lord Hailsham in the House of Lords brought British policy in Africa and our attitude to race relations on to the front page of every newspaper. Students and other Africans living in London made it clear to President Nkrumah and Prime Minister Balewa what their feelings were. Finally, into the planned quietness of the week-end Julius Nyerere dropped his bombshell: 'To vote South Africa in is to vote us out'. His foreful dignified statement, brilliantly dispelled the muddle and the cant which underlay so much speaking and writing about non-racial societies and the basis of association between member states of the Commonwealth.

In 1960 and again this year Labour M.P.s placed on the Order Paper of the House of Commons a motion containing the words: 'The Commonwealth cannot endure unless all its members recognise and guarantee human rights and fundamental freedom irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed'. By letting South Africa go, the Prime Ministers have confirmed that opinion; and they are right. The South African Government has walked out because she will not accept it. Let us hope that all those who remain will ensure that this ideal, so flagrantly denied in South Africa, fully prevails everywhere in other countries of the Commonwealth.

By this decision ten million victims of *apartheid* will become foreigners and cease to be British subjects. They must not be allowed to feel forgotten or abandoned. The Commonwealth nations must intensify their efforts to help them through the United Nations, and especially to free the people of South-West Africa from the tyranny of Union government. Perhaps even more important, the Commonwealth must unite in helping and standing by the people of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Dr. Verwoerd has himself said recently that there is now 'little hope' of ever securing the transfer of these territories to the Union. It was good to hear Mr. Macmillan, in reply to a question from Hugh Gaitskell, make it clear that the United Kingdom will firmly maintain and fulfil all her protectorate rights and duties.

We should recognise, however, that the short-term effects of South Africa's withdrawal will be an intensification of repression within the Union. The recent arrests of 20 moderate African leaders is a predictable portent for the future. Three highly dangerous acts of legislation, including a



publications censorship Bill, were dropped before the Conference so as to improve South Africa's image abroad. These will almost certainly now be implemented. The progressive isolation of South Africa must make it more difficult for the Nationalist Government to rule, so that their control over the lives and livelihoods of the people will become more stringent.

The decision to leave the Commonwealth has deeply shocked South Africa—not only Natal, not only English-speaking South Africans elsewhere, but many liberal-minded Afrikaners also. The opinion so widely expressed by the press of the World that the Commonwealth is now much stronger and more influential because it is no longer comprised by any condonation of *apartheid*, has for the first time brought fully home to them the extent to which that policy has separated them not only from their coloured fellow-citizens but from civilised opinion everywhere. In the long run the trauma will certainly intensify opposition to the present government. In the meantime South Africans living in or escaping to the country should be granted the same privileges as they had while members of the Commonwealth. Ireland provides a useful precedent.

The nationalist government of South Africa has chosen to leave the Commonwealth because she will not accept the obligations of its non-racial character. We look forward to South Africa's rejoining under a government which does accept those obligations.

Hilary Marquand, M.P.

## STALEMATE IN KENYA

**K**ENYA still flounders in dangerous uncertainty, despite calm, well-organised elections which produced coherent results. Out of 33 'open' and therefore African seats, 19 were won by the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) led by James Gichuru and Tom Mboya, and 12 by the Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.) led by Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro. The subsequent indirect elections of four African 'national' members gave K.A.D.U. another three seats and K.A.N.U. another one. If some of the three Asian and one Arab 'national' members line up behind K.A.D.U., K.A.N.U.'s lead will be further shortened.

The elections to the ten European reserved seats showed, as expected, that once the African voters had a say the right-wing Kenya Coalition led by Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, lost its advantage to the more liberal New Kenya Party (N.K.P.) led by Michael Blundell. The final

results gave three seats to the Coalition—two were elected outright in the primary election—and four to the N.K.P. Peter Marriani of the Kenya Farmers' Union, was elected as an Independent for Central Rural. All four of the European 'national' members were from the N.K.P. The campaign for the European seats emphasises the extraordinary change—first effectively demonstrated in Tanganyika—which takes place when European candidates have to solicit African votes. As a result of the franchise, distinguished settlers found themselves for the first time seriously considering the problems of the Africans whose votes they have to solicit.

The election as a whole was a success for the established politicians, and all those who have made a name in the last few years were triumphantly re-elected over lesser known challengers. The exception was Walter Odede, ex-detainee who had been president of the Kenya African Union after Kenyatta's arrest. He was heavily defeated in Central Nyanza; but his election as 'nationalist' member on the K.A.N.U. ticket gives him a seat in Legco. The elections also suggested that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the importance of tribalism, at least in the urban areas—since Tom Mboya, a Luo, was elected for Nairobi East on a largely Kikuyu vote.

Thus a well-balanced legislative council is possible. But its potential cannot be fulfilled until K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U. can come to terms with the Governor over the position of Kenyatta. The Governor's refusal to release Kenyatta immediately despite his own and Mr. Macleod's recognition that to do so would allow him to form a stable government, is neither logical nor ultimately tenable. But it must be recognised that he has taken this stand in response not primarily to pressures in Kenya itself but to those inside the Tory Party in Britain. Mr. Macleod's Africa policies, moderate though they certainly are, have proved too much for his own party to stomach; for they represent a reversal of traditional Tory policy. With South Africa virtually pushed out of the Commonwealth, and powerful pressure from Sir Roy Welensky and settler interests in Central Africa, a decision by Macleod to release Kenyatta immediately might well break him politically.

African intransigence in response to election pledges not to take office without Kenyatta must therefore be set against Macleod's commitments to his supporters. In these deeply regrettable circumstances the quickest way out of the impasse would be for K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U. to take office in government, despite their present stand. It may also be the quickest way to secure Kenyatta's freedom.



## SOUTH WEST AFRICA

**S**OUTH AFRICA has again refused to co-operate with the United Nations Committee on South West Africa, and thus frustrated the chief resolution passed by the General Assembly on South West Africa in December last year. Rejecting "extremist" demands for prompt U.N. action to terminate South Africa's mandate over S.W. Africa, the U.N. asked the Committee on South West Africa to visit the territory immediately "to ascertain and make proposals to the Assembly on (a) the conditions for restoring a climate of peace and security and (b) the steps which would enable the indigenous inhabitants . . . to achieve a wide measure of internal self government designed to lead them to complete independence as soon as possible."

Accordingly, the Committee wrote to the Union government asking for its permission to visit the territory. It received no reply since South Africa does not recognise the legality of the Committee on South West Africa. Instead the Union Minister for External Affairs wrote to the Secretary-General explaining that the International Court of Justice is shortly to hear proceedings on South West in the judicial action Ethiopia and Liberia are bringing against South Africa (see *VENTURE* October 1960); and South Africa therefore regards the matter as *sub judice*, and will not allow the Committee to visit the territory.

This has now been reported to the resumed session of the Trusteeship Committee. By an overwhelming majority the Trusteeship Committee again instructed the Committee on South-West Africa to visit the territory, this time *if necessary without the permission of the Union Government*. Britain abstained for the umpteenth time, giving her usual pathetic excuse.

It may well be asked what South Africa hopes to gain at this stage by refusing to co-operate in any way over South West. Her administration has been universally condemned as a travesty of the letter and the spirit of the mandate under which she came to administer the territory. The last report of the Committee on South West Africa, the language of which is always impeccably temperate, concluded that the application of apartheid was being used to "subordinate the interests of the African population to the policy of white supremacy." It also uncovered facts about the build-up and deployment of military strength which have not been known hitherto. For the first time, for instance, a military base has been established in the north east of the territory—an area in which tribal administration on Bantustan lines ostensibly operates—designed to cover the potential tribal "trouble spots."

It should be obvious that as all this becomes

widely known the demand for direct U.N. intervention will become irresistible. Only if the Union shows some signs of co-operation is there any chance of avoiding such a course. Britain's shocking record on this issue at the U.N. demonstrates how easily she for one can be induced to respond to any sign of flexibility. Moreover a South West African lawyer, Advocate Goldblatt, has pointed out in a recent pamphlet that if South Africa were to submit a Trusteeship agreement on the same lines as the original Mandate agreement, she would be very much less vulnerable than she is at present; for the wording of the latter is vague enough to give her a great deal of leeway.

And yet the Union persists in blind "granite-like" defiance of the U.N. Why? The truth is that Dr. Verwoerd himself, and some of his colleagues, sincerely, not to say fanatically, believe that given time apartheid will redeem itself. This type of mentality is not open to compromise, persuasion or new evidence. It is based on the Calvinistic philosophy that out of suffering the new dawn shall be born, that *Sturm und Drang* produce salvation. It is an attitude which cannot be changed by reasoned consideration of alternatives. For Dr. Verwoerd there are no alternatives. Failure of the U.N. to take firm action to terminate the Mandate can have no effect whatever other than to perpetuate the miserable condition of the inhabitants of South West—all of them, black and white, wards of the international community.

## MALTA

**C**ONSTITUTIONS are usually judged by comparison. In the case of the new proposals for Malta they will be tested against the present position of direct Colonial Office rule; against the 1947 constitution suspended since 1958; and against the Maltese demand for self-determination.

The proposals are based on the recommendations of the Hilary Blood Commission. They allow for a new elected Parliament and Maltese government. There can be no doubt, therefore, that this plan is a major advance from the present unrepresentative situation. To some extent it also marks an advance on the 1947 constitution in that some measure of foreign affairs and defence will come under Maltese control, although, for special reasons, for the time being the government will not control the police.

It is when the proposals are compared with Maltese demands that their limitations become clear. The Blood Commission has tried to base the new Maltese constitution on that of Singapore. This seems sensible, for the two islands have certain similarities in their nationalist sentiments and the dependence, in different degrees, of their econ-



omies on the British Navy. Yet the people of Singapore see their national destiny as a part of the Malayan Federation. In contrast, the Maltese have no hope of a greater unit since the collapse of the plan for integration with Britain. Thus the Maltese nationalist objective is now self-determination and the right to decide whether or not Malta will remain within the Commonwealth.

The new constitution does not explicitly or necessarily frustrate this ambition. Mr. Macleod has wisely emphasised that he regards this constitution as transitional, not as a final stage. But both the major political parties, Dom Mintoff's Labour Party and Borg Olivier's Nationalist Party refused to give evidence to the Commission because its terms of reference did not include a consideration of independence. Relations between Britain and the Maltese have been so soured since the haggling years over integration that the conditions needed for co-operation have largely disappeared.

Nor is it only political and constitutional conditions which weigh in the balance. The main stumbling block over which the integration plan tripped was Britain's aid in transforming the economy from its dependence on the naval dockyard. It is true that Malta has received, and expects, much greater British aid than any other

British colony. It is equally true that no other British colony has had its life so regimented for British purposes. The new Maltese government cannot be expected to shoulder responsibility alone for the rapidly growing problem of unemployment which has developed under Colonial Office rule; it must have some guarantee of adequate British assistance in reshaping the economy.

Now both the Labour Party and the Nationalist Party have rejected the Blood proposals. At present their intransigence is implacable: they refuse even to consider anything less than a constitution worked out by the Maltese themselves. It is difficult to see any alternative than to meet this demand. Only thus can we harness the co-operation of these parties whose overriding strength must be reckoned with. Their tendency to unreasonableness can be counteracted only by giving them the responsibility of working out—or at least sharing in the working out of—their own future. At present we simply encourage them to devote all their energies to often irresponsible agitation against colonial rule.

Nor has Britain a great deal to lose by such a course. The island is no longer regarded as important for defence purposes. It consumes annually about £5 million of British tax-payers' money and none of this can be regarded as constructive investment without political co-operation.

## SIERRA LEONE - INDEPENDENCE

**A**FTER nearly two centuries of British rule Sierra Leone will become independent on the 27th April. It thus belatedly fulfils the wishes of its creators, the 18th century Clapham Sect, who intended that the Colony should be self-governing from its inception in 1887 when the first groups of freed slaves landed from Plymouth. The original settlers included Maroons from Jamaica, and former slaves who had fought on the British side during the American Revolution. To them were added large numbers of Africans who, throughout the following century were liberated from slavers by the Royal Navy. From this group are descended the Creoles, the most westernised community in present-day Sierra Leone.

The original settlement was small, comprising only the 250 square miles of the Freetown peninsula. The country did not attain its present size until 1896 when the Protectorate was declared over the hinterland of Freetown thus creating a country the size of Scotland. The two units, Colony and Protectorate, remained separate until 1951, and the still existing tensions between Creoles and Protectorate Africans are in part a consequence of this division. Creoles were open to European influences for a much longer period than the hinterland Africans. Their early opportunities allowed them to supply the elite not only for Sierra Leone but also for other West African

colonies. They tended to become "more British than the British" and their position vis-a-vis the "natives" has often been likened, with some exaggeration, to that of white settlers in Kenya.

By no stretch of imagination can the country be termed rich—even its long-term economic viability is questionable. But a ten-year development plan launched in 1947 with a budget of over £5 million produced a marked improvement in the economic position. Thus revenue rose from under £2 million in 1945 to £10½ million in 1958. Nevertheless revenue tends to lag behind expenditure and independence is to be accompanied by a very necessary grant of £7½ million from Great Britain.

Sierra Leone is primarily an agricultural economy. Years of neglect have been responsible for erosion on a massive scale and the exhaustion of a soil which was never rich to start with. This natural poverty was not suspected by the early settlers—the idea that the region was suitable for colonisation came from a man who knew it only as a butterfly hunter! It was only when the natural cover was cleared that the heavy tropical rainfall started a process of washing away the soil which will only slowly be reversed. The main hope for soil improvement lies in re-afforestation. But the magnitude of the problem can be gauged by the fact that



after 50 years of forestry management only five per cent of Sierra Leone is under trees. More immediate improvements are resulting from the reclamation of coastal and riverine swamp lands which give a high yield of rice, today the staple food. Apart from rice no cash crop is grown on a large scale and the agriculture remains largely subsistence—though efforts are being made to develop a coffee industry. Farming suffers from the constant flow of labour to the towns. Even the government's dramatic attempt in 1955 to open large tracts of the country to native diamond miners failed to arrest this flow. Freetown's population has risen, at a conservative estimate, by one third since 1939 and rural "immigration" is still increasing.

The country's economic future rests largely on the mines. Diamonds, iron ore and chrome account for about half the total value of exports. But this renders the economy very sensitive to fluctuations in world prices.

It is in the educational field that progress has been most inspiring in this territory. Expenditure under this head has soared from under £100,000 a year immediately after the Second World War to well over £1 million in 1958. The interesting thing about educational expenditure is its slow rate of growth before 1951 and its amazing acceleration after that year in which, for the first time, the legislature had an unofficial majority. The same progress can be seen in the expansion of the number of schools; about 200 in 1945, over 550 today. There has also been an expansion in the country's University at Fourah Bay although the majority of its students still come from other West African territories.

The old political division between Creole and "native" is ceasing to have much meaning now that the Creoles are out numbered even in Freetown by "natives" to whom the franchise was extended in 1956. Women in the Protectorate are still without the vote but its introduction before the next election was agreed by all delegates to the Constitutional Conference. It was on the understanding that the registration of women voters would take place meanwhile, that it was agreed that the elections should be postponed till 1962, a year after independence.

### Political Parties

In the 1957 elections the Creole party, the National Council of Sierra Leone, led by Dr. Bankole-Bright, was eliminated. The Sierra Leone Peoples Party won the majority of seats with the support of the Protectorate peoples. Mr. Rogers-Wright's United Progressive Party also made an impact with an appeal to all sections of the community which was surprisingly successful. There is little visible doctrinal difference between these groups. Other parties which might have had such an ideological basis were crushed during the election campaign. The Labour Party for example, born of a General Strike in 1955, had no success at all: its specific appeal to workers fell on deaf ears. Although there are 14 trade unions, all of them are small in

real as opposed to paper membership and have as yet no inclination to direct political involvement.

Thus the first free direct elections produced an S.L.P.P. government under Sir Milton Margai. Dr. Margai was appointed Chief Minister in 1954 when his experience in the Legislature was accepted by the Governor as warranting it. Under Sir Milton's guidance the territory has made the advances of the last decade. But recently he has come in for a certain amount of criticism. This stems largely from his formation last year of a coalition government of all political groups to pilot the country through independence. The result of this coalition, which gave opposition leaders posts in the administration, was that opposition in the Legislature is negligible. Perhaps it was also the new accession of strength on the part of the new coalition that led the Colonial Secretary to accept its arguments that no general election need be held before independence, and that it would not be necessary to present before this month the constitution which will obtain after independence.

These omissions produced a reaction in the shape of a new party whose leading lights Mr. Siaka Stevens and Mr. I. T. A. Wallace-Johnston, had formerly been members of Dr. Margai's and Mr. Rogers-Wright's parties respectively. This new group, the All People's Congress (A.P.C.) has pointed out that the coalition was never even discussed in the House of Representatives; that government without opposition is unhealthy; that universal adult suffrage does not yet obtain and that it is undesirable that independence should precede the publication and discussion of a new constitution. The underlying fear of the Congress seems to be that an undemocratic regime might be introduced after April. In fact there is little real evidence to support this. The A.P.C. found some support for its programme last November when its candidates defeated the Coalition in the Freetown municipal elections.

An outstanding feature of the new constitution, which will be introduced this month by Order in Council, is the elaborate Declaration of Human Rights, enforceable by the Courts. It covered six pages of the Report of the Conference.

Politics aside, Sierra Leone's problems are enormous. Freetown has a large slum problem. Erosion will remain a headache throughout this century. Health will require a huge annual expenditure and it is hard to see how better educational facilities will be provided without an even greater expenditure. Such problems will become acute after the generous aid of the Colonial Development and Welfare funds are withdrawn. This is likely to increase the attraction to Sierra Leone of joining a future West African Federation; but until such a time there can be no doubt that some form of external economic aid will be necessary if the present rate of development is to be maintained, let alone increased. But the effort will be made and Sierra Leoneans who were using the slogan "Africa for the Africans" over a century ago are determined to prove that they can be successful. Britain will share their hopes.

**R. L. McLaughlan**



# THE DESTINY OF MAURITIUS

THE problem of rapid population growth dominates over half the world. But there are three special features of Mauritius which make this problem especially hard to resolve. First there are already over 650,000 people in an island which is only the size of Surrey. Secondly, there are no easy opportunities for large economic developments in an island which is without any special raw materials and is so remote from the main markets of the world. Thirdly, forty per cent of the population is Roman Catholic.

The government which has to grapple with the problem is the first to be elected by adult suffrage and to have complete authority over home affairs (subject to the reserved powers vested in the Governor.) The Mauritius Labour Party won a substantial majority in the 1959 election. Before embarking on specific new plans for economic and social development it decided to seek advice and two teams of experts have visited the island. Their reports were published simultaneously last month. Professor James Meade headed an economic mission while Professor Richard Titmuss led an enquiry into the social services. The other members of this last team were Brian Abel-Smith and Tony Lynes. For once economic and social development were reviewed at the same time.

The population of Mauritius was fairly stable at around 400,000 for the first forty years of the century. The rapid growth of the population to over 600,000 in less than twenty years can be attributed primarily to the abolition of malaria. And further growth to over one million by 1980 seems inevitable. If present trends continued the island would have to support some three million persons by the end of the century. There is no possibility of solving the problem by emigration. Not only are there no countries willing to accept unskilled immigrants, primarily of Indian origin, on the requisite scale, but the cost of such a policy would be prohibitive. Mauritians are coming and will continue to come to Britain, but the reports stress that migration cannot solve the problem of population growth.

The only alternative to starvation is family limitation on a massive scale and both reports have the courage to say so. Clinics must be established all over the island offering such means of birth control as each prospective parent will accept. The Titmuss Report recommends that an approach should be made to a consortium of foundations for generous financial aid and skilled help. Research is needed to find the means of propagating family limitation which will prove most effective in Mauritius. This recommendation is certain to be fought by the Catholic Church. But as the report says, "The illiberality of some must not thrive on the courtesies of others."

The Titmuss Report contains detailed recommendations for a gradual development of social ser-

vices in a number of phases, but all the recommendations are dominated by the attempt to establish the pattern of a three-child family, which would stabilise the population at about a million in the long run. The report recognises and faces up to the central dilemma of social policy. Poverty is greatest among young children. The low level of health of the Mauritian worker which is noted by doctors and the low work output which is noted by sugar magnates are both attributable in part to malnutrition in early years. Yet the more that is done to raise the living standards of children, the greater the danger of increasing the population. The report recommends limited nutritional services for school children and pre-school children, but the most original suggestion is for a family benefit payable in cash to nearly every family with three children, with no addition for further children and no benefit at all for less than three children. This would emphasize the government's support for the three-child family and provide no incentive for further births.

The family benefit would be non-contributory. Non-contributory benefits are also recommended for widows and orphans. In a country with large scale seasonal unemployment and considerable general unemployment, the authors of the report see no merit in connecting the welfare of widows and children to the work records of husbands and fathers. There is already a modest old age pension on a non-contributory basis; and no change is recommended in this system of finance. The introduction of family planning clinics and non-contributory benefits constitutes the first phase of the Titmuss plan.

## Contributory Social Insurance

Apart from the non-contributory old age pensions, at present the main bulwark of income security is a costly and abused public assistance service based on the principles of the old British Poor Law. And as assistance is available to the sick but not to the unemployed, the understaffed government medical service has been coping with an intolerable burden of work. It is not practicable for doctors to diagnose sickness in any hard and fast way in a community with a low general level of health. To relieve the doctors of part of the burden of certification, it is recommended that some form of financial aid should be given to the unemployed. The form this should take is a contributory scheme of social insurance to cover not only unemployment but sickness as well. The collection of contributions will provide records of employment, and these are essential for distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary unemployment.

The introduction of social insurance is to be the second stage of the Titmuss plan and the formidable administrative problems are not underestimated. The main need will be to establish labour exchanges all over the island which are able to operate an acceptable work test. It is, however, emphasised that unemployment benefit cannot operate without waste and abuse in a country with a high level of unem-

<sup>1</sup> J. C. Meade and others: *The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius*.

Titmuss and Able-Smith: *Social Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius*.



# FIRST STAGE FAMILY PLANNING

ployment. The only really satisfactory answer to the problem of unemployment in Mauritius as elsewhere is to create more jobs. And this is the major concern of Professor Meade's report.

At present, the sugar industry employs half the island's population and provides nearly all the island's exports. The secure market and relatively generous prices under the Commonwealth sugar agreement make sugar the most attractive crop to grow. But there is little prospect of the industry providing much more employment or of finding markets for very much greater production. The Meade Report wants to encourage the many other crops which can grow in Mauritius—tea, tobacco, nuts, potatoes and other vegetables. And it proposes to do this by a tax on sugar production and the establishment of a marketing board to give guaranteed prices and storage facilities for other products.

To stimulate the growth of industries in Mauritius, the Meade Report recommends the development of technical education, the abolition of tariffs on raw materials, heavy duties on imports, the expansion of the electrical power industry, the construction of trading estates, and tax concessions for new enterprises. In addition, an industrial development board should be set up to provide expert advice. And to make room for capital expansion there should be high taxes and greater efficiency in government administration. The Meade Report believes that in total all these measures could find employment for a larger population but not for the "explosion" of population indicated by present trends.

The Titmuss Report makes some very frank comments on the health services. It identifies two central problems which are not peculiar to Mauritius. The first is the shortage of doctors and the second is the low standards of ethical behaviour of some of the existing medical and nursing personnel. The report recommends the establishment of bodies to exercise professional discipline and a variety of suggestions are made to increase the recruitment of doctors. The report notes that there are believed to be more Mauritian doctors practising in Britain and France than in Mauritius itself. The critical problem is to make it attractive for doctors to return to Mauritius after qualification. How far is the British National Health Service attracting away the best medical talent from the under-developed countries?

## Family Doctor Service

The other recommendations on the health services are intended to establish proper priorities for the use of the limited number of doctors. The emphasis is given to preventive work and family planning. Only after these needs are met can further developments in the hospital and general practitioner services be undertaken. Detailed plans are set out for the organisation of a new family doctor service on a different basis to that operated in Britain.

Mauritius possesses not only an antique system of public assistance but also a battery of residential

institutions which are strongly reminiscent of the general mixed workhouses condemned by Beatrice Webb in her minority report on the Poor Laws of 1909. In an extreme case, delinquents, mental deficient, unmarried mothers, orphans and infirm old people are accommodated in the same ward. The report makes an urgent plea for the boarding out of orphans and for classified institutions run on a more humane basis.

It is not possible to do justice to these two reports in a short summary, but throughout both of them the need for family planning is stressed and stressed again. "We would plead" write Titmuss and Abel-Smith, "that our recommendations should be accepted or rejected as a whole. They stand or fall together." Politically it will be tempting for the government to accept the popular recommendations and postpone indefinitely the question of family planning through fear of dividing the nation and losing the electoral support of the more devout Catholics. But this is the road to disaster.

The new Ministers of Mauritius have a tremendous responsibility on their shoulders. The present situation calls for great statesmanship. Decisions of this kind could not possibly be taken by a colonial administration. Only a government elected by the whole population can respond to the challenge. Never before has a new democratic government been faced with decisions of such momentous import for the destiny of its people.

## SOCIALISM IN AFRICA AND ASIA

THE Fabian Commonwealth Bureau has just published a pamphlet called *Principles of Socialism: Africa and Asia*, which represents a new experiment. It is not a conventional research pamphlet but an attempt to set out the principles of democratic socialism and to examine in general how they can be applied in the special circumstances of Africa and Asia. As socialists ourselves we hope we have something to contribute to socialist thinking in the new Commonwealth.

Dr. Rita Hinden, who wrote the pamphlet, is Editor of the British monthly journal *Socialist Commentary*. With Mr. Arthur Creech Jones, who was Colonial Secretary in the Labour Government of 1945-50, she formed the Bureau in 1940. She has written this pamphlet simply and readably in the hope that it will reach as wide a public as possible.

The *Principles of Socialism* can be obtained from the Fabian Bookshop, 11, Dartmouth Street, London, S.W.1. Price 2s.



# The Raisman Report

THE Report of the Economic and Fiscal Commission on East Africa appears at a time when the destiny of East Africa is suspended between much closer co-operation—perhaps even federation—and the possibility of the dissolution even of the existing bonds between the four territories concerned. The Report deals with a crisis in the affairs of the East African Common Market, which is now 'operating under the strain of severe discontent in at least two of the territories'.

The Report inevitably suffers from the fact that it can only recommend limited administrative reforms. The major question cannot be answered: whether the East African countries will be willing to provide the East African High Commission with a constitutional framework which alone can enable it to develop and grow. At present, the Commission consists of the Governors of the three territories. It has, to advise it, and to vote on the matters falling within its competence, a General Legislative Assembly of 33 members. Of these 33, seven are ex officio, six are official, nine are unofficial members appointed by the three Territorial Governors, two are unofficial Arab members appointed by the High Commission, and nine are elected by the three territorial legislatures. In other words, of the 33, 24 are dependent in one way or another on the Governors' nomination—hardly the outcome of a democratic process. Moreover, no Bill may be introduced into the Assembly without the Commission's approval, and the Commission has reserved powers to declare passed a Bill which the Assembly refuses to pass.

## The Dilemma

Because territorial politicians are unwilling to commit large-scale resources to a body which they cannot control, there has been a tendency to spend money at the territorial level at the expense of the inter-territorial. Yet the Raisman Report found that all three governments accepted, with one or two unimportant exceptions, the value of the Commission's services. In an attempt to overcome this dilemma, and to break the pattern of bargaining over inter-territorial services between territorial governments, the Report proposes an independent source of funds for the Commission. Its non-self-contained services, costing about £3.5m. a year, should be financed out of a pooled fund consisting of six per cent. of the customs and excise revenue of each territory, and 40 per cent. of the tax yield on company profits from manufacturing and finance. Half the fund's income would go to the High Commission, and half would be returned to the territories in equal shares of a third each. By this ingenious proposal, the High Commission would be insulated from the pressures of territorial politics. It would also make a token redistribution of funds from Kenya, the main beneficiary, to the aggrieved members of the Common Market, Uganda and Tanganyika.

Yet the chief question remains. Will the territories allow part of their revenues to be commandeered for the E.A.H.C., thereby weakening still further any form of popular control over it? At least at present it must raise its money from territorial votes, which gives the elected governments some control. Or will the Common Market benefits justify development towards a strong political centre?

The Common Market, which would be the basis on which an East African Federation might be constructed, offers the territories the enormous advantage of a single large market, it attracts investors, and it enables loans to be raised more easily for certain services. But it also creates new problems. One territory may grow disproportionately, attracting the lion's share of investment and becoming the centre for companies and agencies operating in all three territories. The advantage of replacing imports with indigenous products may be offset, in the less favoured territories, by the loss of import duty revenue. Thus in East Africa, Kenya has grown twice as fast as Tanganyika and more than three times as fast as Uganda since 1952. Kenya sold £11.1m. worth of her own products to the other two territories in 1959, and re-exported over £20m. worth of imports from the rest of the world to them; but bought only £5.5m. of products from them, plus £4m. worth of re-exports of imported products.

The Report dismisses a little easily the argument that Tanganyika and Uganda may have lost more in terms of import revenue and higher prices than they have gained by the additional income earned in Kenya. It points out that Kenyans will spend part of the additional income in purchases from the other territories; but since Kenya imports more than ten times as much from outside as from the rest of East Africa, the share of extra income going to Tanganyika and Uganda is not likely to be significant.

The new proposals involve a small distribution of income from Kenya to the other two territories, though it amounts to only about one-half per cent. of Kenya's national income. The trouble is the absence of any kind of overall development plan. One was projected by the post-war Labour Government, but was quietly shelved in 1949. If a common market is to work, especially between territories with different economic levels, more is required than the mere removal of trade barriers; the logic of economic development involves not just a common commercial code, but some form of development plan which will enable the poorer members to share in the benefits of growth.

One last thought. Again and again, the Report refers to the gradual diminution of Colonial Development and Welfare grants as the territories approach independence. Obviously this policy needs some serious rethinking. Do we really want to cut off grants for medical research, for the extension of literacy and so on during these crucial years?

Shirley Williams.



# EVENTS OF THE MONTH

(16 February—15 March)

## Ghana/I.C.A.

The International Co-operative Alliance has passed a resolution criticising the Ghana Government for its treatment of the Co-operative Movement there and for the "offensive" behaviour to Mr. Jack Bailey, who was sent to Ghana on a fact-finding mission for the I.C.A. The resolution concludes "The I.C.A. deeply regrets the disappearance of a valued member organisation (the Ghana Co-operative Alliance which has been dissolved) and condemns the methods employed . . ."

President Nkrumah will take over the General Secretaryship of the Convention People's Party on May 1.

## Ghana/I.L.O./Portugal

The government of Ghana has filed a complaint with the International Labour Office to the effect that Portugal is not observing the Forced Labour Convention, 1957, in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea.

The Security Council agreed on March 10 to debate the serious unrest and "abuse of human rights" in Angola.

## Tanganyika

In February 300 cases of Belgian arms consigned to Ruandi Urundi, which were to pass across Tanganyika, were sent back to Belgium from Dar-es-Salaam following representations made by the Tanganyika government.

## 'Colonialism'

U.S. Senator Wayne Morse said in a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 19 that it was time to end British influence on American policy on colonial questions. Senator Morse, who was U.S. delegate to the U.N. Trusteeship Committee said that the U.S. had branded itself as a supporter of colonialism by its voting record, which was dictated by State Department decisions to side with the colonial powers.

## South Africa

The Bishop of Johannesburg, Mr. Ambrose Reeves, resigned the See of Johannesburg on March 2. He had been deported from the Union last year. His book, *Shooting at Sharpeville*, has been banned in South Africa.

The Archbishop of Cape Town, Dr. Joost de Blank, wrote a letter to THE TIMES on March 1 supporting South Africa's re-admission to the Commonwealth. He is backed by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cape Town and four Anglican bishops. The Dutch Reformed Church in the Orange Free State which is not a member of the World Council of Churches and did not take part in the Council's conference in Johannesburg last December, has rejected the Council's declarations; and asked the Cape and Transvaal Dutch Reformed Churches, which participated in the conference, to resign from the Council.

An independent investigation made in Durban shows that African parents have to pay about three times as much as white parents to educate a child up to junior certificate standard.

The police force is to be re-organised, and a police reserve of 5,000 volunteers will supplement it.

## Overseas Students

The British government will spend £3 million on a programme to provide 5,000 extra places for overseas students in hostels where they will live and mix with British students.

## Singapore

The report of the Commission of Enquiry into Mr. Ong Eng Guan's accusation of nepotism on the part of the Premier, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, has completely vindicated the Premier. It describes the allegations as "groundless and recklessly made."

## Fiji

The beginnings of a ministerial system is to be introduced in the Colony. Non-official members of the Executive Council will take over supervisory functions for groups of government departments, though they will not yet be fully responsible Ministers.

## Uganda

Lord Munster, Chairman of the Relationships Commission, will be unable, on medical grounds, to return to Uganda with the Commission, but will remain its Chairman.

## Nigeria

President Senghor of Senegal and Madam Senghor paid a three-day visit to Nigeria in February. The inter-governmental communique emphasised the need for maximum co-operation between African states in economic, technical, social and cultural matters; non-alignment in international affairs; and refusal to interfere in one another's internal affairs. The two countries will exchange diplomatic representatives.

According to the latest Digest of Statistics, savings in Nigeria rose from £673,000 in 1943 to £6½ million in 1956 to over £18 million in September 1960.

## I.C.F.T.U.

An I.C.F.T.U. delegation from member countries of N.A.T.O. are visiting N.A.T.O.'s civil and military authorities to protest against their support for the French in the Algerian war.

## Publications

Report of Constitutional Commission for Malta. (Cmnd. 1261, H.M.S.O. 5s.).

Report of the Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference. (Cmnd. 1291, H.M.S.O. 9d.).

Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change (Cmnd. 1295, H.M.S.O. 1s.).

Northern Rhodesia: Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Proposals for Constitutional Change. (Cmnd. 1301, H.M.S.O. 4d.)



# Parliament and the Commonwealth

## CENTRAL AFRICA DEBATE—HOUSE OF LORDS

**Lord Listowel** in opening the debate said that he believed that all shared the keen hope that nothing would be said which would increase tension between the races, or be used to encourage either side to overstep the law. Perhaps, indeed they might go one step further together. Could they not join in a friendly appeal to Africans and Europeans in the Federation not to allow their strong—and understandably strong—feelings about political issues to explode in violent deeds or unconstitutional behaviour?

**Lord Salisbury** urged that what we were facing was a crisis of confidence. There were divergences of view between the two Governments (the Federal Government and the U.K.) and perhaps to some extent that was inevitable. But it was not that which had made the situation so intractable. It was the miasma of mistrust that had arisen to cloud the issue and to embitter the controversy. Until only a few months ago the attitude of White Rhodesians to the Home Government had been one of complete loyalty and deep affection. He had been there many times over the last 30 or 40 years and knew that Rhodesia was the most British, in the fullest sense of that word, of any of the realms and territories of the British Crown. Now, within the space of a few months, those feelings had given way to others of a very different kind: of suspicion, of contempt, almost of hatred of the home Government. The Colonial Secretary was a man of most unusual intellectual brilliance. He was, moreover, both brave and resolute. Those were valuable and not too common attributes in politics. But the fact remained that he believed the Colonial Secretary had adopted, especially in his relationship to the white communities of Africa, a most unhappy and entirely wrong approach. He had been too clever by half. It almost seemed as if, when he abandoned the sphere of bridge for the sphere of politics, he brought his bridge technique with him. At any rate, it had become the convinced view of the white people in Eastern and Central Africa that it had been his object to outwit them and that he had done it most successfully.

**The Lord Chancellor** said he had a very simple view of the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility: it could be summed up in the motto of an old French house, "Who touches my brother touches me." And that was a view which he believed called for an answer from him. The grounds of the attack were in the main, two. It had been said that the Colonial Secretary was "too clever by half." That remark, which could only be calculated offensiveness, was, he supposed, designed to imply that the Colonial Secretary was disingenuous; it could not have any other meaning. Then Lord Salisbury had been kind enough to say that Mr. Macleod as a bridge player, approached probably the most serious problem facing mankind today—namely, how this world was going to continue with different races playing different parts—with a desire to outwit his opponents. The answer was that anyone who knew Mr. Macleod would not

accept that statement for a moment. It was poles apart from his character as his friends and colleagues knew it.

**Lord Faringdon** said that he did not like any of the special provisions for a franchise. They were all methods of favouring a particular race or a particular class in the State; and once it was agreed to have a democratic system he believed it was no more difficult—in fact he thought it easier—to draw up a register on a manhood suffrage basis than any of the new-fangled franchises which were so fashionable at the present time. Along with an African majority, a Common Roll and a manhood suffrage, he would like to see reserved seats. He did not think it an ideal solution, but he would prefer it to any other. He suggested that it was the only solution under which in fact one would get Africans voting for Europeans and Europeans voting for Africans. He believed that the Colonial Secretary would do well to reconsider his scheme along these lines.

**Lord Hailsham** said that although both upper and lower rolls were technically non-racial, the lower roll would in fact enfranchise some 70,000 Africans—70,000 out of a population of 2½ million. These were the revolutionary proposals for which the Government had been indicted in speech after speech by noble Lords in various quarters of the House.

Then who were these 70,000 of the lower roll? Much had been heard about the moderate Africans. He did not know where the critics were going to find the moderate African. Was it going to be in the House of Chiefs? The White Paper revealed that the House of Chiefs made a demand, which had been rejected, for "one man, one vote." Was it among the headmen; was it among the hereditary councillors; was it among the department councillors to native authorities, or any other members of native authorities; members of native courts; headmen of registered villages; pensioners; ex-Service men; or improved farmers? He did not know where one would look for the moderate African unless it was in quarters like this. And yet it was to these people, and to these people only, plus a literacy test, or with the alternative test of property, that we looked for the 70,000 people who were going into the lower roll. Listening to some of the criticism levelled against these proposals one would think that we were going into some sort of Congolese Republic with universal suffrage. In fact, what had been proposed was an upper roll of 30,000 and a lower roll of 70,000 in each case out of a population of 2½ million.

**Lord Hailsham** continued that in addition to those and to the national seats there were the six official members and an unlimited number of nominated members that could redress any lack of balance there might be. And when all was said and done, the Legislative Council was only advisory. These were the proposals which had been described as improvident, reckless, going too fast in favour of the Africans, or tending to put power into the hands of extremists. (March 8.)



# Guide to Books . . .

## British Intervention in Malaya

by C. Northcote Parkinson (Singapore: University of Malaya Press).

IN these days of passion about "colonialism" this book gives a close-up of how it all happened in part of Asia. It is no simple picture. For decades after the East India Company established its trading centres at Penang and Singapore British governments struggled to restrain local governors from intervening in the anarchy-ridden Malay States. Why should the British tax-payer finance the assumption of new responsibilities which would bring benefit only to local British and Chinese concession-hunters? Sir Harry Ord, the first governor appointed by the Colonial Office, was intensely unpopular with the Singapore merchants because, on Whitehall orders, he refused to establish British power in the Malay Peninsula. When intervention did come, political rather than economic motives were probably decisive (rubber of course had not yet arrived in Malaya). Lord Kimberley's injunction to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873 to consider intervention was almost certainly due to fear that otherwise a rival power, probably Bismarck's Germany, would be invited in.

This book does not really weigh the British motives for intervention; but the direct play of competing local interests is brought out most clearly. The machinations of Singapore notables like the barrister J. G. Davidson (whose earlier Selangor tin concession won him administrative power when intervention came); the atmosphere of the Singapore clubs, where Frank Swettenham met European soldiers of fortune already in the pav of warring Malay chiefs, before intervention; the dilemmas and jealousies of colonial officials—all these come out beautifully in the despatches and letters quoted. Ironically the interventionist with the most idealistic motives, James Birch, ended with a spear in his body, through trying to impose virtue on the tax-farming, slave-owing Malays. The portrait of him here is subtle and moving.

The two important Governors stand out in clear profile: Sir Andrew Clarke shrewd, persuasive, a Victorian radical, and a rebel against Whitehall red tape; Sir William Jervois, like his predecessor an engineer, but less supple-minded and more military, though exceptionally determined and gifted with strong nerves. What does not come out in Professor Parkinson's book—except in asides about the burning of Malay villages—is the nastiness of these 19th century punitive expeditions by powerfully equipped Europeans in Asia. But any account based like this one on the records of a Colonial Administration must read a little like G. A. Henty. Certainly the Malay chiefs and their Chinese immigrant supporters were nasty to each other too. Which does not excuse anything. However, if one reads this most interesting book carefully one seems to see both "heroes" and "villains" on either side of a not entirely complete colour bar.

D.A.S.

## Jomo Kenyatta

by George Delf (Gollancz, 21s.)

KENYA'S progress towards independence, and the future of the proposal for a Federation of East Africa are at present very much in the balance. With an African majority in the Legislative Council, the formation of a government is retarded by the Governor's refusal to meet KANU'S demand for the unconditional release of Jomo Kenyatta. Despite the intense feelings which his name arouses on all sides in Kenya, very little is known either about his past or about his attitude to recent developments there. Two irreconcilable myths have risen about him and in this first biographical sketch George Delf has attempted to put into perspective the man who has been variously described as "the leader unto darkness and death" and "the Light of Kenya." This book comes at a most opportune moment and fills the gap between ignorance and definitive biography.

Was Kenyatta guilty of managing Mau Mau? What part will the man, as opposed to the myths about him, play in the future of East Africa if he is given the opportunity? These are the first questions which spring to mind. Mr. Delf wisely does not answer the first question directly. He is more concerned that the course of events and the pressures on Africans and Europeans alike should be understood than that individuals should be judged. It is, however, a book of strong opinions, pungently and often humorously expressed.

Many liberal people are forced to the reluctant conclusion that, however dubious some of the evidence at the original Kapenguria trial may appear, they cannot ignore the fact that Kenyatta's appeal was eventually dismissed by the Privy Council. They are also influenced by the number of Mau Mau convictions which were set aside by the Privy Council and the East African Court of Appeal. It should be remembered, however, that these Courts were commenting only upon the conduct of Kenyatta's trial, and not upon the validity of the evidence which the Court accepted as factual. One of the two crucial prosecution witnesses has since been convicted of perjury.

Perhaps the most currently interesting question attempted is what kind of person Kenyatta is and was. Here is a man who has dabbled in Quakerism, seen and rejected Communism, produced a major piece of anthropological scholarship, and who is now reliably said to be a follower of Gandhian non-violence and a devotee of classical music. Could such a man have interrupted this type of personal development with an interlude so degrading and bestial as Mau Mau involved? Very few of the many people who knew him during his 16 years stay in England believe that he could have fallen so low. Arthur Creech Jones, who has been described as the pre-war "Member for the Kikuyu," has said that the Kenyatta whom he knew as well as anyone in England up to 1946 could not have been guilty of



managing Mau Mau. Contrary opinions are also quoted, and the reader is left to form his own judgment.

By tracing the changing climate of opinion in Kenya which is necessary to an understanding of Kenyatta's own role there, Mr. Delf gives us an excellent and perceptive picture of the development of modern Kenya. Kenyatta himself remains a complex and unknown character, as indeed he will be until he is a completely free man whose actions will speak for themselves.

J. S.

## The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth by K. C. Wheare (O.U.P. 25s.)

### Empire into Commonwealth

by the Rt. Hon. Lord Attlee (O.U.P. 7s. 6d.)

**M**R. WHEARE'S book is learned, authoritative and up-to-date—even including, as well as other similar Acts, a copy of the Nigerian Independence Act, 1960. It will be required reading for students of constitutional law throughout the Commonwealth, and will doubtless find its way to Law libraries everywhere. But it is by no means a dry legal tome: it is written with the clarity and ease that only a master of the subject could command. It brings out very clearly indeed the rapidly changing nature of the Commonwealth and the frequency with which its legal forms have had to be modified in order to keep pace with political facts. "New situations and new needs," says Mr. Wheare, "would bring new rules. For in the Commonwealth, members decide what they want to do, and then bring the rules up to date."

Why the members wanted to do what they did is for the politician rather than the lawyer to explain. Lord Attlee's Chichele Lectures therefore make useful preliminary reading for students who want to tackle Mr. Wheare. Disarming criticism by declaring that "I have no pretensions to be either an historian or a political scientist," he simply says of the evolution of the Commonwealth "I have seen it happen, and have taken some share in bringing it about." His is a very informal, but not uninformed, commentary about the transformation of the Empire which flourished and seemed to be victorious, happy and glorious when he was a schoolboy, but which is now a very loose association of states with differing foreign policies, sharply different constitutions and institutions, even divergent attitudes to the rule of law. They are "for the present," as Mr. Wheare

puts it, "united by a common recognition of the Queen as a symbol of their free association and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth"; but in the last analysis it seems that what really holds them together is what Earl Attlee calls "a very real family feeling" bred of association together over a fairly long period, in the art of government.

While he fully appreciates that the Commonwealth is always changing and will probably change again, Mr. Wheare finds that at the present time it has three outstanding features: its members are equals, however they may differ in area, in population or in age as independent states, they all recognise the Queen as the Head of the Commonwealth and therefore as the symbol of their association; and finally they are all pledged to "free co-operation" as the "instrument" of the Commonwealth. Their chief method of co-operation is constant consultation—by meetings of Prime Ministers, meetings of High Commissioners, exchange of telegrams, creation of institutes and similar bodies for collection and dissemination of knowledge, and latterly by exchange of scholars and teachers. They stick together because nobody forces them to do so and because they can easily understand one another. If one day they fall apart it will be because the United Kingdom, the custodian of the common language, obstinately refuses to help them—not to speak of its own children—by adopting a phonetic system of spelling!

HILARY A. MARQUAND

### SHORTER NOTICES

**Industrial Development in the U.K. Dependencies.** (C.O.I.) A broad survey of the present stage, future prospects and sources of finance for industrial development in the colonies.

**Author's and Writer's Who's Who** (Burke's Peerage Ltd., 35s.). This is the fourth edition. It brings up-to-date biographies of English and Welsh-speaking writers, factual and imaginative.

**The Urban African in Local Government: A Study of the Advisory Board System and its Operation**, by Laurence Reyburn (S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 5s.). This *Fact Paper* reveals the system under which Africans 'participate' in local government in South Africa.

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